Techniques to provide client-side security for storage of data in a network environment

ABSTRACT

Various embodiments are generally directed to an apparatus, method and other techniques to de determine a secure memory region for a transaction, the secure memory region associated with a security association context to perform one or more of an encryption/decryption operation and an authentication operation for the transaction, perform one or more of the encryption/decryption operation and the authentication operation for the transaction based on the security association context, and cause communication of the transaction.

TECHNICAL FIELD

Embodiments described herein generally include techniques to provideclient-side security for storage of data in a network environment,wherein the storage of the data occurs on a remote storage node.

BACKGROUND

Today's existing network storage data protection methods vary widely.For example, for all three storage types, block storage, object storage,and file storage, different approaches are utilized to perform dataprotection. Typically, a combination of industry standard securityprotocols are used, such as one for data transfer, confined to thenetwork, and one for data at rest, on storage devices. To date, noindustry standards exist to protect both storage data in-flight, thatis, on the network, and at rest, persistent on the disk. Instead, ITadministrators resort to a combination of a secure network protocol anda disk-centric data-at-rest cryptographic protocol.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 illustrates an example of a first system.

FIGS. 2A/2B illustrates an example of a node.

FIGS. 3A/3B illustrate examples of systems.

FIGS. 4A-4C illustrates an example of a first logic flow.

FIG. 5 illustrates an example of a processing flow to get data.

FIGS. 6A-6C illustrates examples of processing flows to put data.

FIG. 7 illustrates an example of a second logic flow.

FIG. 8 illustrates an example embodiment of a computing architecture.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Embodiments discussed may relate to performing client-side cryptographicoperations, such as encryption/decryption and authentication for datastore remotely, on a remote storage node, for example. As will bediscussed in more detail below, embodiments include circuitry using asecurity association context associated with a secure memory region toprocess a transaction and perform the cryptographic operations. In oneexample, the interface circuitry may determine a secure memory regionfor a transaction based on information received from an operating systemor application. The secure memory region is associated with the securityassociation context to perform one or more of the encryption/decryptionoperation and the authentication operation for the transaction. Morespecifically, the secure memory region includes a security associationcontext index and a starting nonce, the security association contexttable is used to locate a security association context for thetransaction. The security association context includes information toencrypt/decrypt information and perform authentication, such as keys,cryptographic settings, and so forth, as will be discussed in moredetail.

Embodiments include performing one or more of an encryption/decryptionoperation and the authentication operation for the transaction based onthe security association context. In embodiments, theencryption/decryption operation and the authentication operation may beperformed at the client-side, e.g. a client node, and may be based onthe type of transaction and the cryptographic operations indicated inthe security association context for the data associated with thetransaction. For example, a write (put) transaction may requireencrypting information in one or more packets based on the securityassociation context. If authentication is indicated, a messageauthentication code (MAC) may also be created for the information forstorage on a remote device. In another example, a read (get) transactionmay require decryption of information received from a remote storagebased on the security association context. Further, authentication onthe information may be performed utilizing MAC information received withthe information. Embodiments may also include causing communication ofthe transaction. For example, if the transaction is a write transaction,information may be communicated to a remote storage node for storage. Inanother example, if the transaction is a read transaction, theinformation may be provided to other elements of the client node, suchas memory for use by an application requesting the information. Thetransaction may not be performed until the encryption/decryptionoperation and/or the authentication operation have completed.Embodiments are not limited in this manner and further details bediscussed in the following description.

Reference is now made to the drawings, wherein like reference numeralsare used to refer to like elements throughout. In the followingdescription, for purposes of explanation, numerous specific details areset forth to provide a thorough understanding thereof. It may beevident, however, that the novel embodiments can be practiced withoutthese specific details. In other instances, well-known structures anddevices are shown in block diagram form in order to facilitate adescription thereof. The intention is to cover all modifications,equivalents, and alternatives consistent with the claimed subjectmatter.

FIG. 1 illustrates an example embodiment of a system 100 in whichaspects of the present disclosure may be employed to control remotedirect memory access and provide client-side security for data stored ina remote device or node, such as a remote storage node 103.

The system 100 may include a number of client nodes 101-1 through 101-m,where m may be any positive integer, each may include resources such asa computing processor 110, a memory 115, and an interface 120. Note thatembodiments are not limited in this manner, and the client nodes 101 mayinclude other elements, resources, circuitry, and so forth to processinformation and data. The client nodes 101 may be coupled via one ormore network interconnects 130 which may include fabric and Ethernetlinks, or other fabric links to communicate information between theclient nodes 101 and with storage node 103. The one or more networkinterconnects may include switches and interconnects and may communicateinformation and data between the client nodes 101 and the storage node103 electrically and optically, for example. However, embodiments arenot limited in this manner. For example, embodiments may include morethan one storage node 103.

In some embodiments, the system 100 may be a cloud-computingenvironment, enterprise environment, datacenter environment,virtualization environment, and combination thereof. For example, eachof the client nodes 101 may provide processing and storage capabilitiesto a number of users, which may be different from each other. Each ofthe users may be provided their own operating environment (guestoperating system) in a virtualized manner, for example. The system 100may include a storage node 103 (or a number of storage nodes/devices)capable of storing information and data for users in a persistent mannereven when a particular user is not utilizing a client node 101. Morespecifically, the storage node 103 may provide storing, and access todata and information to any number of client nodes 101 via one or morenetwork interconnects.

In various embodiments, each of the client nodes 101 may be embodied asany type of computing device, including a personal computing, a desktopcomputer, a tablet computer, a netbook computer, a notebook computer, alaptop computer, a server, server farm, blade server, or any other typeof server, and so forth. In some embodiments, the client nodes 101 mayinclude memory 115 and a computing processor 110 having one or morecores. Embodiments are not limited in this manner. In some instances,the client nodes 101 may include other resources, such as storageresources, which may include persistent memory to store data andinformation.

In embodiments, the memory 115 may be one or more of volatile memoryincluding random access memory (RAM) dynamic RAM (DRAM), static RAM(SRAM), double data rate synchronous dynamic RAM (DDR SDRAM), SDRAM,DDR1 SDRAM, DDR2 SDRAM, SSD3 SDRAM, single data rate SDRAM (SDR SDRAM),and so forth.

Embodiments are not limited in this manner, and other memory types maybe contemplated and be consistent with embodiments discussed herein. Forexample, the memory 105 may be a three-dimensional crosspoint memorydevice, or other byte addressable write-in-place nonvolatile memorydevices. In embodiments, the memory devices may be or may include memorydevices that use chalcogenide glass, multi-threshold level NAND flashmemory, NOR flash memory, single or multi-level Phase Change Memory(PCM), a resistive memory, nanowire memory, ferroelectric transistorrandom access memory (FeTRAM), anti-ferroelectric memory,magnetoresistive random access memory (MRAM) memory that incorporatesmemristor technology, resistive memory including the metal oxide base,the oxygen vacancy base and the conductive bridge Random Access Memory(CB-RAM), or spin-transfer torque (STT)-MRAM, a spintronic magneticjunction memory based device, a magnetic tunneling junction (MTJ) baseddevice, a DW (Domain Wall) and SOT (Spin-Orbit Transfer) based device, athyristor-based memory device, or a combination of any of the above, orother memory.

In some embodiments, the client node 101 may include one or morecomputing processors 110 which each may include one or more cores andprocessing circuitry to process information for the client nodes 101.The computing processor 110 may be one or more of any type ofcomputational element, such as but not limited to, a microprocessor, aprocessor, central processing unit (CPU), digital signal processingunit, dual-core processor, mobile device processor, desktop processor,single core processor, a system-on-chip (SoC) device, complexinstruction set computing (CISC) microprocessor, a reduced instructionset (RISC) microprocessor, a very long instruction word (VLIW)microprocessor, or any other type of processor or processing circuit ona single chip or integrated circuit. In some embodiments, the computingprocessor 110 may be connected to and communicate with the otherelements of the computing system via one or more interconnects, such asone or more buses, control lines, and data lines.

In embodiments, the computing processor 110 includes cores and elementsto read and write data in memory, such as memory 115 In some instances,a computing processor 110 may read/write data in memory which isco-located within the same node 101. In other instances, the computingprocessor 110 may read/write data in memory and storage in a differentnode 101 and storage node 103, via a remote direct memory access (RDMA)mechanism, for example. Embodiments discussed here will be in referenceto a client node 101 storing data and information in a storage node 103utilizing RDMA. The data and information may be communicated and storedin blocks, files, and objects. Thus, storage node 103 may be one or moreblock-based, file-based, and/or object-based network storage variant.

In some instances, a client node 101 and computing processor 110 storinginformation and data on storage node 103 may require one or moresecurity measures to be implemented to ensure data security and/orauthenticity. Current protection methods for enterprise and datacenternetworked storage data vary widely. In one example a combination ofindustry standard security protocols is utilized, one for data transfer(in-flight), confined to the network, and one for data at rest, onstorage devices. To date, no industry standards exist to protect bothstorage data in-flight (that is, on the network) and at rest (persistenton the disk). Embodiments discussed herein provide a client-centric,hardware-offloaded, tenant-managed, security scheme encompassingdata-at-rest privacy and authentication/integrity and data-in-flightprivacy. Embodiments also include an option for tenant-based keymanagement in multi-tenant datacenters. Further, the security mechanismmay utilize a hardware-based inline crypto-plus-RDMA combination forlow-latency, secure data transfers, and storage.

In embodiments, a client node 101 includes an interface 120 tocommunicate information and data with other client nodes 101 and storagenodes 103. In one example, a client node 101 may read and writeinformation to a storage node 103 and storage 125 using RDMA. RDMA iswell suited to networked storage data transfer because of itslow-latency hardware-offloaded network stack, avoidance of receive datacopies through page-aligned data placement of receive application data,and the option of direct user-mode access to the interface 120, such asan RDMA Network Interface Card (RNIC) or NIC. As a result, storageapplications running over RDMA achieve significantly lower latency andhost computing processor utilization compared with conventional,kernel-software-based TCP/IP stacks. As will be discussed in more detailin FIG. 2, the interface 120 may provide the security mechanism toperform client-side security operations.

FIG. 2A/2B illustrates an example of a client node 201, which may besimilar to or the same as any one of the nodes discussed concerningsystem 100. The node 201 includes a computing processor 210, memory 215,and an interface 220. The interface 220, such as a network interfacecomponent or device, may include additional elements to provide securitymechanisms for data and information stored on a storage node. Morespecifically, the interface 220 may include interface circuitry toprocess one or more instruction. The interface 220 may includecryptographic logic 202, RDMA logic 204, and MAC/PHY circuitry 206. Thecryptographic logic 202 and the RDMA logic 204 may at least be partiallyimplemented in the interface circuitry to process one or moreinstructions stored in memory, such as firmware, storage, and/ornon-volatile memory.

FIG. 2B illustrates the node 201 including a security associationcontext table 251 and a memory region table 261. The securityassociation context table 251 include any number of entries 253-m(security association context table entries), where m is any positiveinteger. Each of the entries 253 is associated and is referenced by asecurity association context index 255 value and includes a securityassociation context specifying a cryptographic type and a secure datakey.

Similarly, the memory region table 261 also include entries 263-n(memory region entries), where n is any positive integer. Each of theentries 263 is associated with a different secure memory region andincludes information for data stored in the associated secure memoryregion. For example, an entry includes a buffer starting address,length, associated page list, access control flags, a securityassociation context index, a starting nonce, and associated valid bits.Each of the entries 263 are reference by memory region index value thatis included in a request from an operating system or application.

The interface 220 including the cryptographic logic 202 and the RDMAlogic 204 provides the cryptographic security, including in-flight andat-rest protection, utilizing the cryptographic logic 202 at the UpperLayer Protocol (ULP) layer, above the RDMA logic 204 transport layer.Thus, at least a portion of the cryptographic logic 202 and RDMA logic204 may be implemented at the ULP, above the transport layer.Utilization of RDMA by the interface 220 to communicate data enablesfurther hardware offload of ULPs, e.g. the cryptographic logic 202 andthe RDMA logic 204, in the networking stack because its application datamemory regions are clearly delineated, with each memory region havingits own properties. Attaching per-tenant, per-user or per-applicationsecurity associations to memory regions allows the interface 220 (RNIC)to direct inbound and outbound data to the cryptographic logic 202, e.g.an inline crypto engine, to encrypt/decrypt and/or authenticate/sign thedata. As will be discussed in more detail, one or two securityassociations (for encryption and/or authentication/integrity) may beattached to a memory region. The association of a security associationto a memory region rather than a networked connection (Queue Pair) isuseful in multi-tenant environments where the service provider managestenant keys, and different tenants may be running virtual machines (VMs)on the same physical server or node over a single Queue Pair.Embodiments are not limited to multi-tenant environments and client-sideencryption features discussed herein are also applicable in a bare-metal(no virtualization/hypervisor) environment.

In embodiments, the cryptographic logic 202 may perform encryption anddecryption operations for data sent to and received from a remotestorage device, e.g. a storage node coupled via one or more networkinterconnects. The cryptographic logic 202 may also performauthentication operations for data stored in remote storage.

In one example, to process an incoming data packet, the interface 220receives the data packet at the MAC/PHY layer 206. The received data maybe encrypted and/or received with authentication information, e.g.message authentication code (MAC), signature, a hash or partial hashvalue. Note that the data may have been encrypted by the client node 201or a different client utilized by a user when the data was sent to andstored in the remote storage. The received data packet may have beensent from a storage node in response to an input/output operation (TOP),e.g. a transaction request, to get data from remote storage. The IOP maybe generated at the client node 201 and cause the remote storage to sendone or more RDMA messages (writes).

In embodiments, the RDMA logic 204 may receive the data or an indicationof the received data. The RDMA logic 204 may determine a securityassociation context related to the data and packet based on the IOPsrequest for the data, which may include a memory region index value,such as a STag or a R_Key, to perform a look up in a memory regiontable, and determine a security association context index. The RDMAlogic 204 uses the memory region index value (STag or R_Key) to look upand determine a security association context index, which is used todetermine security association context in a security association contexttable. The RDMA logic 204 may access the client node's host buffers'data memory region(s) context and determine the memory region(s) aresecure memory region(s) with attached security association context(s),for example. A secure memory region may be an RDMA memory region andassociated with the memory region table including the active/validsecurity association context index and a starting nonce to perform acryptographic operation. The security association context index is usedto determine the security association context in a security associationcontext table. Each security association context may indicate protocolinformation including a cryptographic protocol type for associated data,and secure key information, e.g., a key used for cryptographicoperations by the cryptographic logic 202.

The RDMA logic 204 may append the security association context index toeach RDMA request communicated to host memory, such as memory 215. Thecryptographic logic 202 may intercept these RDMA requests, steering thepacket data to the cryptographic logic 202 itself. The cryptographiclogic 202 may apply cryptographic processing, e.g. decryption forreceived encrypted data and/or verification of message authenticationcode, the hash value(s), or partial hash value. More specifically, thecryptographic logic 202 may utilize the appended security associationcontext index to perform a lookup in the security association contexttable to determine an associated entry. The entry includes acryptographic protocol, and the secret data key for the data to performthe cryptographic processing. For received data, the cryptographic logic202 may send or push the processed data, e.g. plaintext data, to thehost memory, e.g. memory 215. The cryptographic logic 202 also returns acompletion/status descriptor to the RDMA logic 204. The RDMA logic 204holds up subsequent RNIC completions/interrupts to host memory on thesame Queue Pair (QP) until the receive data plaintext is written to hostmemory. This avoids a race hazard between the cryptographic logic 202writing plaintext data to host memory and the storage software stackbeing informed by the RNIC that the IOP is complete.

In another example flow to process an outgoing data packet, theinterface 220 including the RDMA logic 204 receives a data request, e.g.an IOP request. The IOP request may have been generated based on anapplication running in an operating system or virtual operatingenvironment and include a memory region index value for a memory regiontable. The RDMA logic 204 uses the memory region index value, such as aSTag or a R_Key, to perform a look up in a memory region table anddetermine an entry corresponding with the memory region index value. Theentry includes information, such as, a buffer starting address, length,associated page list, access control flags, a security associationcontext index, a starting nonce, and associated valid bits. The RDMAlogic 204 uses the memory region index value (STag or R_Key) to look upand determine the security association context index in the entry, whichis used to determine security association context in a securityassociation context table. More specifically, the security associationcontext index is used to determine an entry in the security associationcontext table including a cryptographic type and a secret data key usedto perform cryptographic operations for the data.

The RDMA logic 204 may append the security association context index tothe RDMA requests communicated to host memory, such as memory 215. Thecryptographic logic 202 may intercept these RDMA requests, steering thepacket data to the cryptographic logic 202 itself. The cryptographiclogic 202 may apply cryptographic processing, e.g. encryption and/orgenerating message authentication code, such as a hash or signature.More specifically, the cryptographic logic 202 may utilize the appendedsecurity association context index to perform lookup and determine anentry, e.g. a security association context. The entry includescryptographic protocol, and the secret data key for the data to performthe cryptographic processing. In one example, the cryptographic logic202 may encrypt data using the cryptographic protocol, secret data key,and starting nonce (from memory region table). For data to be written orput in remote storage, the cryptographic logic 202 may send or push theprocessed data, e.g. encrypted data and message authentication code, tothe RDMA logic 204 and MAC/PHY 206 for communication to the remotestorage. The cryptographic logic 202 also returns a completion/statusdescriptor to the RDMA logic 204.

FIG. 3A illustrates an example operating environment 300 including aclient node 301 coupled with a storage node 303 via a network 305including one or more network interconnects. In the illustrated example,the client node 301 may be a “bare-metal” node and does not include avirtual environment. The client node 301 may include an operating system330, which may be stored in the storage and/or memory, and providesystem software to manage computer hardware (memory, computingprocessor, interfaces, connected devices, and so forth) and softwareresources and provide common services for computer programs, such asapplications 312. For example, the operating system 330 may manage andprovide services to enable applications 312 to read and write data tothe storage node 303.

In embodiments, the operating system 330 may enable block-based,file-based, and object-based networked storage variants for applications312. For example, the operating system 330 may include an object handler332 to provide storage services for applications 312 utilizing networkedobject-based storage. Object-based storage is accessed as whole objects.Thus, it is quite practical from a storage overhead perspective togenerate one message authentication code (MAC), e.g. signature and ahash value, per object and store it alongside data on a target disk ofthe remote storage. A hardware-based scheme, as performed by thecryptographic logic 302, for example, may perform stateful hashprocessing. The cryptographic logic 302 may store two partial hashes(one transmit, one receive) per connection for network inbound packetsor outbound packet schedules. In one example of stateful hashprocessing, each object may be serially transferred on a singleconnection.

In embodiments, the operating system may also include a file handler 334to provide storage services for applications utilizing networkedfile-based storage, and a block handler 336 to provide storage servicesfor applications 312 utilizing networked block-based storage. Block- andfile-based storage generally has fine-grained, random accesses. Forblock storage, the minimum unit of storage is a disk sector, 4 KB, withlegacy Hard Disk Drives (HDDs) having 512-byte sectors, for example. Theminimum unit of file-based transfer is a host system page, predominantly4 KB, sometimes higher. The storing of a message authentication code perdisk sector creates an overhead of 64 bytes for each 4 KB sector.Enterprise/datacenter SSDs and HDDs may support storage of metadata persector, for uses like T10 Dif (non-secure data integrity). Since bothfile and block-based storage is randomly accessible on a page (file) orsector (block) basis, MACs for such storage must be computed, stored andchecked on a per page/sector basis, for a given write/store/read cycle.Enterprise/datacenter disks and SSDs and their access protocols (localand network) include additional per-sector storage space, labeledgenerically “metadata,” for application-specific purposes.Enterprise/datacenter disks/SSDs typically offer 64B of metadata foreach 4 KB sector. Embodiments discussed herein use such metadata spacefor storing each sector/page's MAC.

In embodiments, each of the object handler 332, the file handler 334,and block handler 336 may include a “shim,” or “security shim” such as acomponent, module, software code, and so forth to tag individual IOPrequests with memory region indices, based on the disk volume (block),filesystem (file) or bucket (object) targeted by the IOP requests. Thememory region indices may be utilized by the RDMA logic 304 to determinesecurity association context indices, and the cryptographic logic 302uses the security association context indices to determine associatedsecurity association contexts. The cryptographic logic 302, using asecurity association context, applies encryption/decryption andauthentication to data that is being read or written to the remotestorage 303. More specifically, the cryptographic logic 302 maydetermine the security association context based on the securityassociation context indices and determine a cryptographic protocol typefor associated data, and a secret data key. The cryptographic logic 302may use a starting nonce for the cryptographic algorithm used forencryption/decryption, as previously discussed from the RDMA logic 304.The RDMA logic 304 may append the security association context index toa DMA (or RDMA) request to memory, and the cryptographic logic 302 mayintercept request. The cryptographic logic 302 may performencryption/decryption and/or authentication operations based on theappended security association context index.

In embodiments, the client node 301 and the operating system 330 mayinclude user space 310 to enable programs and applications not part ofthe kernel to run. For example, the user space 310 may includeapplications 312 which may be a program made up of code and operate toprovide functionality to a user. An application 312 may be a group offunctions, tasks, and activities to cause a device, such as a clientnode 301 to operate in a particular manner that is useful to a user.Examples of applications 312 include word processing application, aspreadsheet application, accounting application, an image application,web browser, media applications, games, and so forth. Embodiments arenot limited to these examples of applications 312.

The operating system 330 may also provide key management functionalityin user space 310. For example, the operating system 330 may include akey management component 314-1 to process and manage keys relating toencryption and decryption for user data. The operating system 330 mayinclude another key management component 314-2 to process and managekeys relating to authentication for users. In some embodiments, keymanagement for encryption/decryption and authentication may be providedby a single key management component, and embodiments are not limited inthis manner.

The key management components 314-1 and 314-2 may be capable ofproviding key management functionality to a number of users that may beusing the client node 301 at the same or different times. For example,the key management components 314-1 and 314-2 may perform key revocationand renewal in accordance with user/tenant policies. These renewedsecret data keys are passed from the key management components 314-1 and314-2 to the cryptographic logic 302 and stored by the cryptographiclogic 302 in a secure memory/storage location, e.g. the securityassociation context table. The secret data keys may be passed from keymanagement software to cryptographic logic 302. The cryptographic logic302 may return the index of the security association related to the userand/memory regions for the user's data. The object handler 332, filehandler 334, and the block handler 336 may utilize the index to tag theIOPs as previously discussed. Thus, different users have differentsecret data keys to encrypt/decrypt and authenticate data in remotestorage. The object handler 332, file handler 334, and the block hander336 may process read/write requests for different user's utilizing theirunique indices of the security association. Each user's data isprocessed in accordance with their particular security associationcontext and secret data key to encrypt and decrypt data and sign datafor remote storage.

FIG. 3B illustrates an example operating environment 350 including aclient node 351 coupled to a storage node 303 via a network 305. In theillustrated example, the client node 351 may utilize the storage node303 to store data, e.g. cloud-based storage. Moreover, the operatingenvironment 350 is a cloud-based environment capable of providing anumber of computing services to users. In the illustrated example, theclient node 351 may be one of many client nodes capable of providingstorage and processing services to users.

In embodiments, the client node 351 may provide services to a number ofusers via virtualization. For example, the client node 351 may include ahypervisor 352 or virtual machine monitor (VMM) to provide virtualenvironments for users. For example, the hypervisor 352 may be utilizedto generate one or more virtual machines, and each of the virtualmachines may provide an environment for a user that is separated fromother users and virtual machines. The hypervisor 352 may generate andprovide the virtual machine having a guest operating system 370 to avirtual operating platform. The hypervisor 352 may manage each of thevirtual machines and guest operating systems 370.

In embodiments, each of the guest operating systems 370 may include anobject handler 372, a file handler 374, and block handler 376 to processread/write requests to remote storage, such as storage node 303, for oneor more applications 362. As similarly discussed above, each of theobject handler 372, the file handler 374, and block handler 376 in aguest operating system 370 may include a “shim,” such as a component,module, software code, and so forth to tag individual TOP requests withmemory region indicies, based on the disk volume (block), filesystem(file) or bucket (object) targeted by the IOP requests. In this exampleembodiment, a guest operating system 370 may directly post the IOPrequests to the interface 320 hardware utilizing single rootinput/output virtualization (SR-IOV) or other mechanisms, for example,and bypass the hypervisor 352. A memory region index may be used todetermine a security association index, which may be further used by thecryptographic logic 302 to determine an associated security associationcontext. The cryptographic logic 302 utilizes the security associationcontext and applies encryption/decryption and authentication to datathat is being read or written to the remote storage. More specifically,the cryptographic logic 302 may determine the security associationcontext based on the security association indices tagged in the IOPrequest and determine a cryptographic protocol type for associated data,and a secret data key to perform encryption/decryption, as previouslydiscussed.

In embodiments, each of the virtual machines 380 include a guest a userspace 360 having separate applications 362, key management components364-1 and 364-2. A Virtual machine 380 includes a guest operating system370 having an object handler 372, a file handler 374, and a blockhandler 376 along with additional components to support processing forthe user and the user's applications 362. In embodiments, security shimsin the Object Handler 372, File Handler 374, and Block Handler 376within Guest Operating System 370 may associate their IOPs with asecurity association index, via the IOPs' RDMA memory regions.Supporting user-space utilities Key MGR 364-1 and Key 364-2 may offerkey revocation and renewal services for encryption and/orauthentication/integrity.

FIGS. 4A-4C illustrates an example of a first logic flow 400 that may berepresentative of some or all of the operations executed by one or moreembodiments described herein. For example, the logic flow 400 mayillustrate operations performed by a node, and in particular aninterface, such as an RNIC including an RDMA logic and a cryptographiclogic. However, embodiments are not limited in this manner.

At block 402, embodiments include receiving one or more keys to performsecurity operations for data stored remotely, e.g. on a remote storagenode coupled via a network interconnect. The one or more keys may beused to encrypt/decrypt and/or perform authentication operations.Moreover, the keys may be received from an operating system and may bebased on a credential provider by a user or other means, such as from atenant's virtual machine's guest operating system. In one example, auser may enter a password via a user interface, for example, and theoperating system may generate a secret data key that may be used toencrypt data for storage on the remote storage node and decrypt receivedfrom the remote storage node that is associated with the user.Embodiments include enabling different users to have different passwordsand secret data keys. Thus, one user may not be able to decrypt datarelating to another user.

At block 404, the logic flow 400 includes storing the one or more keysin a secure memory location. The secure memory location may be a table,e.g. a security association context table, or the like and stored in amemory of the interface or a secure region of host memory. Embodimentsalso include determining a memory region of host memory to utilize whenprocessing IOPs relating to storage of a user's data at block 406.Different user's data may be allocated separate and secure memoryregions to store data either for writing to the remote storage or dataread from the remote storage.

At block 408, embodiments include determining a security associationcontext for the memory region and associated with a particular user'sdata. More specifically, a memory region index is used to determine anentry in a memory region table including a security association contextindex, and other information. The security association context index isused to determine an entry in a security association context table and asecurity association context. The security association context may be a“recipe” used to encrypt/decrypt data and perform authentication for thedata. For example, the security authentication context for a particularmemory region associated with user's data may indicate a cryptographicprotocol type for associated data used to encrypt/decrypt, and thesecret data key used to encrypt or decrypt data. The securityassociation context information is used with a starting nonce for thecryptographic algorithm to perform the encryption/decryption (for blockstorage, this may be the Logical Base Address of the data on disk).

At block 410, embodiments include send or indicating the memory regionindex value associated with a memory region for data to an operatingsystem. In a bare-metal system, there may be a single operating systemto receive the index, and in a virtualized environment a guest operatingsystem for the particular user may receive the index value for thesecurity association context. The operating system/guest operatingsystem may include handlers that may use the memory region index to tagIOPs communicated to the interface to process remotely stored data usingsecurity features.

At block 412, embodiments include receiving an IOP, such as atransaction request, from an operating system/guest operating system. Asmentioned, the IOP may include or be tagged with a memory region indexused to identify a particular entry in a memory region table including asecurity association context index value further used to determine asecurity association context index value for data stored/read from aremote storage. At block 414, the logic flow 400 may include determiningwhether the IOP is a put (write transaction) to write data to a remotestorage or a get (read transaction) to read data from a remote storage.If the IOP indicates that data is to be read from a remote storage, thelogic flow 400 may continue in FIG. 4B at block 416.

At 416, the logic flow 400 may include fast registering a secure memoryregion of host memory to store the received data and posting a Getrequest to a remote storage node. The Get request may be an RDMA requestand include a single, virtually addressed Scatter/Gather Element (SGE)pointing to the secure memory sink buffer, e.g. the secure memoryregion. The remote storage node may receive the Get request, parse theGet request, and determine the data (and MAC if authentication is used)to send back to the client node and interface.

At block 418, embodiments include receiving, by an interface, data, andMAC (if authentication is utilized). The data/MAC may be received fromthe remote storage node in one or more RDMA write messages. Each of theRDMA writes messages may include a portion of data, encrypted, requestedby the client node. The interface may also receive a MAC value in anRDMA write a message if an authentication is being utilized. The MAC maybe stored on the remote storage node as previously discussed above inFIG. 3A

At block 420, the logic flow 400 include decrypting and authenticatingthe data. The decrypted data (plaintext data) may be stored or sent tothe host memory and provided to the operating system for use at block422. To decrypt the data, the interface may utilize the securityassociation context to determine a decryption method, and the secretdata key. For example, RDMA logic identifies an entry in the memoryregion table based on the memory region index value in the request, anddetermine the security association context index value in the entry ofthe memory region table. The RDMA logic also determines the startingnonce in the memory region table entry. The RDMA logic may pass thesecurity association context index value and the nonce to thecryptographic logic. The cryptographic logic further uses thisinformation (security association context index value and the nonce) todetermine the cryptographic type and the secret data key for therequest. The cryptographic logic uses the information to perform acryptographic operation. If authentication is utilized, the interfacemay authenticate the data prior to providing it to the host memory. Toauthenticate the data, the interface may generate a hash value based onthe received and decrypted data and compare it to the hash valuereceived from the remote storage. If the values match the data may beauthenticated and if they do not match, the data may not beauthenticated and may be discarded. An error may be generated if thedata is not authenticated.

In embodiments, if the IOP indicates that data is to be written toremote storage, the logic flow 400 may continue in FIG. 4C at block 424.The logic flow 400, at block 424, includes sending a put request to aremote storage node from an interface. In some instances, the putrequest may be an RDMA Send command including an SGE pointing to acreated secure memory region to store the data to be written to theremote storage node. The remote storage node may receive the putrequest, process the put request, and reply with one or more RDMA readrequests to draw data down from the client node. The RDMA readrequest(s) may include or reference the SGE. At block 428, the interfaceand client node may receive the one or more RDMA read requests. Furtherand at block 430, the interface may encrypt and generate a MAC (orpartial MAC) value for data to be sent to the remote storage node. Forexample, RDMA logic identifies an entry in the memory region table basedon the memory region index value in the request, and determines thesecurity association context index value in the entry of the memoryregion table. The RDMA logic also determines the starting nonce in thememory region table entry. The RDMA logic may pass the securityassociation context index value and the nonce to the cryptographiclogic. The cryptographic logic further uses this information (securityassociation context index value and the nonce) to determine thecryptographic type and the secret data key for the request. Thecryptographic logic uses the information to perform a cryptographicoperation. The interface may send the data and MAC to the remote storagein RDMA read responses at block 432. In some instances, authenticationmay not be used, and a MAC may not be generated and sent to the remotestorage node. FIGS. 5, and 6A-6C illustrate further examples ofprocessing flows to read and write data to a remote storage nodeutilizing security operations.

FIG. 5 illustrates an example processing flow 500 to retrieve data froma storage node 503 by a client node 501. In the illustrated exampleprocessing flow 500, the storage node 503 may be object based storageand may be storing data for the client node 501 as objects. Theillustrated processing flow 500 may be for a 1 MB Get with encryptionand authentication/integrity; however, embodiments are not limited inthis manner. The Get IOP includes Get (Send/Receive), data (RDMA Write),and Completion (Send/Receive) Messages in the RDMA network. In thisexample, data is encrypted and securely signed, with a 64-byte MAC, onthe target storage disk of the storage node 503, having been encryptedand signed earlier by the client node 501.

The processing flow 500 illustrates a number of communications andoperations that are performed for each IOP of a 1 MB Get with encryptionand authentication. For an IOP, the client node 501 may allocate 1megabyte (MB) local pinned landing buffer in the object storage stack ofmemory 515 to receive the requested object from the storage node 503 atline 502. The client node 501 may create a queue pair (QP) and mark itas one supporting a secure memory region/secure memory window at line504. The client node 501 may fast-register these pages for the 1 MBlocal pinned landing buffer as a single secure memory region of thememory 515 by posting a fast memory registration to the interface sendqueue at line 506. The secure memory region layout is defined as datastride of 1 MB and a 64-byte MAC. The client node 501 then posts a Getrequest to the storage node 503 at lines 508 and 510. The Get requestmay be an RDMA request and include a single, virtually addressedScatter/Gather Element (SGE) pointing to the secure memory sink bufferin the client node's 501 memory 515.

At line 510, the storage node 503 including the storage node's 503storage stack of memory 529 receives the Get request and parses the Getrequest. The storage node 503 may retrieve the data and MAC from localmass storage based on the Get request and information in the Getrequest. At lines 512-1 through 512-x, where x may be any positiveinteger and based on the size of the data, the storage node 503 maytransfer Read data plus MAC to the Client using a single 1 MB+64-byte(B) RDMA Write Message as a number of packets, such as 2 kilobyte (KB)packets. The storage node may send the MAC in a single 64 B packet atline 514.

The client node 501 may receive the data and MAC at lines 512-1 through512-x and 514 and stores per-QP, partial MAC work-in-progresscomputations between packets or outbound schedules. The received datamay be fed to the cryptographic logic in order, precluding out-of-orderiWarp data placement by the client nodes 501 interfaces. Further, whenthe client node's 501 interface receives each RDMA Write packet, theclient node 501 including the RDMA logic uses information in thereceived RDMA Write packet headers, e.g., STag or R_Key, to look up anentry in the memory region table, determines a security associationcontext index value. The security association context index value isused to look up a security association context in an entry in a securityassociation context table. Embodiments include validating the securityassociation context and extracting security association details from thesecurity association context. The cryptographic logic may use thesecurity association context and information passed from the RDMA logic,including the nonce to perform a cryptographic operation. The securityassociation context calls for both decryption and authentication.

The client node 501 including the cryptographic logic performsdecryption and authentication of the packet payload. For authentication,the cryptographic logic retrieves the partial MAC and updates it withthe incoming data, e.g. MAC data at line 514. The cryptographic logicgenerates a MAC value of the object and compares it against thatreceived from MAC in the packet from the storage node 503. If generatedMAC value does not match the MAC value communicated from the storagenode 503, the secure memory region context is colored, e.g. an error ormiss occurs.

At line 516, the client node 501 receives the Get completion messageand, at line 518 determines the status of the secure memory regionassociated with the data transfer, via an ib_check_mr_status( ) verbcall, for example. If the secure memory region is colored, the Get iscompleted with a failure status. The explicit check status verb call isneeded because the incoming RDMA Write may not generate a completion atthe client node 501. At line 522, the client node 501 may close the IOPwith a local invalidate (LocalInv) posting that invalidates the securememory region. In some instances, the storage node 503 may perform thisinvalidation by issuing a Send-with-Invalidate with its CompletionMessage at line 518.

FIG. 6A illustrates an example processing flow 600 to perform a 16 KBnon-volatile memory express over fabrics (NVMe-oF) sequential write tostorage node 603 from the client node 601 with encryption only, noauthentication. At line 602, the client node 601 may allocate a localpinned buffer in the storage stack of memory 615 to store data forsending to the storage node 603. The client node 601 may create a queuepair (QP) and mark it as one supporting a secure memory region/securememory window at line 604. At line 606, the client node may fastregister the 16 KB source buffer as a secure memory region which willsubsequently cause encryption of the Write outbound data. For example, acryptographic logic may determine a security association contextassociated with the secure memory region for the IOP associated with thedata. In one example, the security association context may indicate thatthe data is to be encrypted utilizing XTS-AES, for example, have astarting nonce corresponding to the Write's Logical Base Address (LBA)on disk.

At line 608 a post send (PostSend) command may be issued and, at line610 the client node 601 may issue a send/receive command to the storagenode 603. The send/receive command may contain an address (SGE to pointto the secure memory region) and extent of the secure memory region ofmemory 615. The storage node 603, requiring no security functionality,posts or creates a memory region as a receive buffer for the data atline 612 and creates a QP at line 614. Note that the memory regioncreated and line 612 and the QP created at line 614 may occur prior toother operations performed by storage node 603.

Further and at line 616, the storage node 603 may parse the send/receivecommand and issue a post send (RDMA Read request) command to retrievedata from the client node 601. At line 618, the storage node 603 mayissue a single RDMA Read request to draw data down from the client node601. The RDMA Read request may reference or include the transferred SGEfrom the send/receive command at line 610. The client node 601 mayvalidate the RDMA Read request from the storage node 603 and at lines622-1 through 622-x, where x may be any positive integer, issue one ormore RDMA Read responses with encrypted data. In one example, thenetwork path maximum transmission unit (PMTU) may be 4 KB. Thus, in thisexample the corresponding RDMA Read response is divided into four,4096-B (4 KB) ciphertext packets, each including encrypted data. Foreach of the RDMA Read responses, the interface 620 including the RDMAlogic and the cryptographic logic may fetch plaintext data from memory615. The RDMA logic may provide the encryption details based on asecurity association context associated with a secure memory region andan IOP to write the data. In one example, the cryptographic logic mayencrypt the plaintext data utilizing the LBA nonce that the interface620 increments by byte-count for each RDMA fetch quantum (the 16 KB ofapplication data may be splayed across multiple physical buffers inmemory 615.

The storage node 603 may receive each of the RDMA Read responseincluding the encrypted data via interface 623 and write the data tomemory 629. The data may then be written to storage, e.g. hard disksand/or SSDs and becomes secure data at rest. At line 624, the storagenode 603 may issue a post send (PostSend) completion command and send anRDMA message 626 to the client node 601 to indicate completion. Sinceauthentication is not used in this example, the client node 601 need notcheck the secure memory region status at the end of the IOP.

FIG. 6B illustrates an example processing flow 630 to perform a 16 KBNVMe-oF sequential write to storage node 603 from client node 601 withencryption, authentication, and stateful encryption processing. In thiscase, data passes through the cryptographic logic of interface 620 inorder and generates a partial MAC value, each of which is communicatedin different packets. In this example, the format of data on the networkis a four-times repeated sequence of 4096 bytes (4 KB) utilizingXTS-AES-encryption, followed by a 64-byte MAC. In this case, the networkMTU is 4 KB, so MACs are not aligned to packet boundaries, and thecryptographic logic must retain partial MAC calculations (values), perconnection, between packets.

At line 632, the client node 601 may allocate a local pinned buffer inthe storage stack of memory 615 to store data for sending to the storagenode 603. The client node 601 may create a queue pair (QP) and mark itas one supporting a secure memory region/secure memory window at line634. At line 636, the client node may fast register the 16 KB sourcebuffer as a secure memory region which will subsequently causeencryption of the Write outbound data. For example, a cryptographiclogic may determine a security association context associated with thesecure memory region for the TOP associated with the data.

At line 638 a post send (PostSend) command may be issued and, at line640 the client node 601 may issue a send/receive command to the storagenode 603. The send/receive command may include SGE pointing to thesecure memory region of the memory 615 to draw down the data. Thestorage node 603, requiring no security functionality, posts or createsa memory region as a receive buffer for the data at line 642 and createsa QP at line 644. Note that the memory region created and line 642 andthe QP created at line 644 may occur prior to other operations performedby storage node 603.

Further and at line 646, the storage node 603 may parse the send/receivecommand and issue a post send (PostSend) command. At line 648, thestorage node 603 may issue a single RDMA Read request to draw data downthe data from the client node 601. The RDMA Read request may referenceor include the transferred SGE from the send/receive command at line640. The client node 601 may validate the RDMA Read request from thestorage node 603 and at lines 650-1 through 650-z, where z may be anypositive integer, issue one or more RDMA Read responses with encrypteddata. In this example, authentication may be utilized, and MAC (hash)values may be communicated with the encrypted data. The client node 601may send a first packet (RDMA Read response) including only encrypteddata at line 650-1. All subsequent packets (RDMA Read responses) mayinclude a MAC (hash) value based on the previous data transmitted. Forexample, a second packet may be communicated with encrypted data andinclude a MAC value based on the encrypted data communicated in thefirst packet at line 650-1, for example. The network path maximumtransmission unit (PMTU) may be 4 KB, as previously discussed. Thus, inthis example the corresponding RDMA Read response is divided into four,4096-B (4 KB) ciphertext packets, the first packet including encrypteddata only and the subsequent packet including encrypted data and a MACvalue. At line 652, fifth packet (RDMA Read response) may becommunicated that includes the remaining encrypted data and final MACvalue. The fifth packet may be 256 bytes in this example.

For each of the RDMA Read responses, the interface 620 including theRDMA logic and the cryptographic logic may fetch plaintext data from thememory 615. The RDMA logic may provide a security association contextindex value to cryptographic logic to determine a security associationcontext associated with a secure memory region and an IOP to write thedata. In one example, the cryptographic logic may encrypt the plaintextdata utilizing the LBA nonce that the interface 620 increments bybyte-count for each RDMA fetch quantum (the 16 KB of application datamay be splayed across multiple physical buffers in memory 615. Thecryptographic logic may also generate a partial MAC value and store thepartial MAC value in a stateful manner to communicate in a next packet.

The storage node 603 may receive each of the RDMA Read responseincluding the encrypted data via interface 623 and write the data tomemory 629. The data may be stored in the storage, such as HDD and/orSSD and become secure data at rest. At line 654, the storage node 603may issue a post send (PostSend) completion command and send an RDMAmessage 656 to the client node 601 to indicate completion. At line 658the client node 601 may determine the status of the secure memory regionand issue a local invalidation or validation post.

FIG. 6C illustrates an example processing flow 660 to perform a 16 KBNVMe-oF sequential write to storage node 603 from client node 601 withencryption, authentication, and out-of-order/stateless cryptographicprocessing. In some embodiments, the cryptographic logic may not becapable of storing partial MAC values per connection, or out of orderdata reception is required. In these instances, the 16 KB Write IOP issplit into four, 4 KB+RDMA Read requests (678-1 through 678-a) at thestorage node 603. The MAC values may be aligned to packet boundaries,and as such, the cryptographic logic may not need to store partial MACvalues between transmitting schedules of a given QP.

At line 662, the client node 601 may allocate a local pinned buffer inthe storage stack of memory 615 to store data for sending to the storagenode 603. The client node 601 may create a queue pair (QP) and mark itas one supporting a secure memory region/secure memory window at line664. At line 666, the client node may fast register the 16 KB sourcebuffer as a secure memory region and cause encryption of the Writeoutbound data. For example, a cryptographic logic may determine asecurity association context associated with the secure memory regionfor the TOP associated with the data.

At line 668 a post send (PostSend) command may be issued and, at line670 the client node 601 may issue a send/receive command to the storagenode 603. The send/receive command may include SGE pointing to thesecure memory region of the memory 615 to draw down the data. Thestorage node 603, requiring no security functionality, posts or createsa memory region as a receive buffer for the data at line 672 and createsa QP at line 674. Note that the memory region created and line 672 andthe QP created at line 674 may occur prior to other operations performedby storage node 603.

Further and at line 676, the storage node 603 may parse the send/receivecommand to issue a post send (PostSend) command. As mentioned, thestorage node 603 may issue a number of RDMA Read request to draw downdata from the client node 601 at lines 678-1 through 678-a, where a maybe any positive integer. Each of the RDMA Read requests may reference orinclude the transferred SGE from the RDMA Write command at line 670. Theclient node 601 may validate the RDMA Read requests from the storagenode 603 and at lines 680-1 through 680-b, where b may be any positiveinteger, issue one or more RDMA Read responses with encrypted data andaligned MAC values. In this example, authentication may be utilized, andpartial MAC (hash) values may be communicated with the encrypted data.

For each of the RDMA Read responses, the interface 620 including theRDMA logic and the cryptographic logic may fetch plaintext data from thememory 615. The RDMA logic may provide the encryption details based on asecurity association context associated with a secure memory region andan IOP to write the data. In one example, the cryptographic logic mayencrypt the plaintext data utilizing the LBA nonce that the interface620 increments by byte-count for each RDMA fetch quantum, the 16 KB ofapplication data may be splayed across multiple physical buffers inmemory 615.

The storage node 603 may receive each of the RDMA Read responsesincluding the encrypted data and MAC values via interface 626 and writethe data to memory 629. The data may be stored in the storage, e.g. HDDand/or SSD, and become secure data at rest. At line 682, the storagenode 603 may issue a post send (PostSend) completion command and a sendan RDMA message 684 to the client node 601 to indicate completion. Atline 686 the client node 601 may determine the status of the securememory region and issue a local invalidation or validation post.

FIG. 7 illustrates an example of a first logic flow 700 that may berepresentative of some or all of the operations executed by one or moreembodiments described herein. For example, the logic flow 700 mayillustrate operations performed by a node, as described herein.

At block 705, the logic flow 700 may include determining a secure memoryregion for a transaction, the secure memory region associated with asecurity association context to perform one or more of anencryption/decryption operation and an authentication operation for thetransaction. The security association context may include information toencrypt/decrypt and perform authentication for the cryptographic logic.

At block 710, the logic flow 700 includes performing one or more of theencryption/decryption operation and the authentication operation for thetransaction based on the security association context. In embodiments,the encryption/decryption operation and the authentication operation maybe performed at the client-side, e.g. a client node, and may be based onthe type of transaction. For example, a write (put) transaction mayrequire encrypting information in one or more packets based on thesecurity association context. A MAC or partial MAC may also be createdfor the information for storage on a remote device if authentication isbeing utilized. In another example, a read (get) transaction may requiredecryption of information received from a remote storage based on thesecurity association context. Further, authentication on the informationmay be perform utilizing MAC information received with the information.

At block 715, embodiments may include causing communication of thetransaction. For example, if the transaction is a write transaction,information may be communicated to a remote storage node for storage. Inanother example, if the transaction is a read transaction, theinformation may be provided to other elements of the client node, suchas memory for use by an application requesting the information. Thetransaction may not be performed until the encryption/decryptionoperation and/or the authentication operation have successfullycompleted.

FIG. 8 illustrates an embodiment of an exemplary computing architecture800 suitable for implementing various embodiments as previouslydescribed. In embodiments, the computing architecture 800 may include orbe implemented as part of a node, for example.

As used in this application, the terms “system” and “component” areintended to refer to a computer-related entity, either hardware, acombination of hardware and software, software, or software inexecution, examples of which are provided by the exemplary computingarchitecture 800. For example, a component can be, but is not limited tobeing, a process running on a processor, a processor, a hard disk drive,multiple storage drives (of optical and/or magnetic storage medium), anobject, an executable, a thread of execution, a program, and/or acomputer. By way of illustration, both an application running on aserver and the server can be a component. One or more components canreside within a process and thread of execution, and a component can belocalized on one computer and distributed between two or more computers.Further, components may be communicatively coupled to each other byvarious types of communications media to coordinate operations. Thecoordination may involve the uni-directional or bi-directional exchangeof information. For instance, the components may communicate informationin the form of signals communicated over the communications media. Theinformation can be implemented as signals allocated to various signallines. In such allocations, each message is a signal. Furtherembodiments, however, may alternatively employ data messages. Such datamessages may be sent across various connections. Exemplary connectionsinclude parallel interfaces, serial interfaces, and bus interfaces.

The computing architecture 800 includes various common computingelements, such as one or more processors, multi-core processors,co-processors, memory units, chipsets, controllers, peripherals,interfaces, oscillators, timing devices, video cards, audio cards,multimedia input/output (I/O) components, power supplies, and so forth.The embodiments, however, are not limited to implementation by thecomputing architecture 800.

As shown in FIG. 8, the computing architecture 800 includes a processingunit 804, a system memory 806 and a system bus 808. The processing unit804 can be any of various commercially available processors.

The system bus 808 provides an interface for system componentsincluding, but not limited to, the system memory 806 to the processingunit 804. The system bus 808 can be any of several types of busstructure that may further interconnect to a memory bus (with or withouta memory controller), a peripheral bus, and a local bus using any of avariety of commercially available bus architectures. Interface adaptersmay connect to the system bus 808 via slot architecture. Example slotarchitectures may include without limitation Accelerated Graphics Port(AGP), Card Bus, (Extended) Industry Standard Architecture ((E)ISA),Micro Channel Architecture (MCA), NuBus, Peripheral ComponentInterconnect (Extended) (PCI(X)), PCI Express, Personal Computer MemoryCard International Association (PCMCIA), and the like.

The computing architecture 800 may include or implement various articlesof manufacture. An article of manufacture may include acomputer-readable storage medium to store logic. Examples of acomputer-readable storage medium may include any tangible media capableof storing electronic data, including volatile memory or non-volatilememory, removable or non-removable memory, erasable or non-erasablememory, writeable or re-writeable memory, and so forth. Examples oflogic may include executable computer program instructions implementedusing any suitable type of code, such as source code, compiled code,interpreted code, executable code, static code, dynamic code,object-oriented code, visual code, and the like. Embodiments may also beat least partly implemented as instructions contained in or on anon-transitory computer-readable medium, which may be read and executedby one or more processors to enable performance of the operationsdescribed herein.

The system memory 806 may include various types of computer-readablestorage media in the form of one or more higher speed memory units, suchas read-only memory (ROM), random-access memory (RAM), dynamic RAM(DRAM), Double-Data-Rate DRAM (DDRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), staticRAM (SRAM), programmable ROM (PROM), erasable programmable ROM (EPROM),electrically erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM), flash memory, polymermemory such as ferroelectric polymer memory, ovonic memory, phase changeor ferroelectric memory, silicon-oxide-nitride-oxide-silicon (SONOS)memory, magnetic or optical cards, an array of devices such as RedundantArray of Independent Disks (RAID) drives, solid state memory devices(e.g., USB memory, solid state drives (SSD) and any other type ofstorage media suitable for storing information. In the illustratedembodiment shown in FIG. 8, the system memory 806 can includenon-volatile memory 810 and volatile memory 812. A basic input/outputsystem (BIOS) can be stored in the non-volatile memory 810.

The computer 802 may include various types of computer-readable storagemedia in the form of one or more lower speed memory units, including aninternal (or external) hard disk drive (HDD) 814, a magnetic floppy diskdrive (FDD) 816 to read from or write to a removable magnetic disk 818,and an optical disk drive 820 to read from or write to a removableoptical disk 822 (e.g., a CD-ROM or DVD). The HDD 814, FDD 816 andoptical disk drive 820 can be connected to the system bus 808 by an HDDinterface 824, an FDD interface 826 and an optical drive interface 828,respectively. The HDD interface 824 for external drive implementationscan include at least one or both of Universal Serial Bus (USB) and IEEE1394 interface technologies.

The drives and associated computer-readable media provide volatile andnonvolatile storage of data, data structures, computer-executableinstructions, and so forth. For example, a number of program modules canbe stored in the drives and memory units 810, 812, including anoperating system 830, one or more application programs 832, otherprogram modules 834, and program data 836. In one embodiment, the one ormore application programs 832, other program modules 834, and programdata 836 can include, for example, the various applications andcomponents of the system 700.

A user can enter commands and information into the computer 802 throughone or more wire/wireless input devices, for example, a keyboard 838 anda pointing device, such as a mouse 840. Other input devices may includemicrophones, infra-red (IR) remote controls, radio-frequency (RF) remotecontrols, game pads, stylus pens, card readers, dongles, finger printreaders, gloves, graphics tablets, joysticks, keyboards, retina readers,touch screens (e.g., capacitive, resistive, etc.), trackballs, trackpads, sensors, styluses, and the like. These and other input devices areoften connected to the processing unit 804 through an input deviceinterface 842 that is coupled to the system bus 808, but can beconnected by other interfaces such as a parallel port, IEEE 1394 serialport, a game port, a USB port, an IR interface, and so forth.

A monitor 844 or other type of display device is also connected to thesystem bus 808 via an interface, such as a video adaptor 846. Themonitor 844 may be internal or external to the computer 802. In additionto the monitor 844, a computer typically includes other peripheraloutput devices, such as speakers, printers, and so forth.

The computer 802 may operate in a networked environment using logicalconnections via wire and wireless communications to one or more remotecomputers, such as a remote computer 848. The remote computer 848 can bea workstation, a server computer, a router, a personal computer,portable computer, microprocessor-based entertainment appliance, a peerdevice or other common network node, and typically includes many or allof the elements described relative to the computer 802, although, forpurposes of brevity, only a memory/storage device 850 is illustrated.The logical connections depicted include wire/wireless connectivity to alocal area network (LAN) 852 and larger networks, for example, a widearea network (WAN) 854. Such LAN and WAN networking environments arecommonplace in offices and companies and facilitate enterprise-widecomputer networks, such as intranets, all of which may connect to aglobal communications network, for example, the Internet.

When used in a LAN networking environment, the computer 802 is connectedto the LAN 852 through a wire and/or wireless communication networkinterface or adaptor 856. The adaptor 856 can facilitate wire and/orwireless communications to the LAN 852, which may also include awireless access point disposed thereon for communicating with thewireless functionality of the adaptor 856.

When used in a WAN networking environment, the computer 802 can includea modem 858, or is connected to a communications server on the WAN 854,or has other means for establishing communications over the WAN 854,such as by way of the Internet. The modem 858, which can be internal orexternal and a wire and/or wireless device, connects to the system bus808 via the input device interface 842. In a networked environment,program modules depicted relative to the computer 802, or portionsthereof, can be stored in the remote memory/storage device 850. It willbe appreciated that the network connections shown are exemplary andother means of establishing a communications link between the computerscan be used.

The computer 802 is operable to communicate with wire and wirelessdevices or entities using the IEEE 802 family of standards, such aswireless devices operatively disposed in wireless communication (e.g.,IEEE 802.11 over-the-air modulation techniques). This includes at leastWi-Fi (or Wireless Fidelity), WiMax, and Bluetooth™ wirelesstechnologies, among others. Thus, the communication can be a predefinedstructure as with a conventional network or simply an ad hoccommunication between at least two devices. Wi-Fi networks use radiotechnologies called IEEE 802.11x (a, b, g, n, etc.) to provide secure,reliable, fast wireless connectivity. A Wi-Fi network can be used toconnect computers to each other, to the Internet, and to wire networks(which use IEEE 802.3-related media and functions).

The various elements of the devices as previously described withreference to FIGS. 1-8 may include various hardware elements, softwareelements, or a combination of both. Examples of hardware elements mayinclude devices, logic devices, components, processors, microprocessors,circuits, processors, circuit elements (e.g., transistors, resistors,capacitors, inductors, and so forth), integrated circuits, applicationspecific integrated circuits (ASIC), programmable logic devices (PLD),digital signal processors (DSP), field programmable gate array (FPGA),memory units, logic gates, registers, semiconductor device, chips,microchips, chip sets, and so forth. Examples of software elements mayinclude software components, programs, applications, computer programs,application programs, system programs, software development programs,machine programs, operating system software, middleware, firmware,software modules, routines, subroutines, functions, methods, procedures,software interfaces, application program interfaces (API), instructionsets, computing code, computer code, code segments, computer codesegments, words, values, symbols, or any combination thereof. However,determining whether an embodiment is implemented using hardware elementsand/or software elements may vary in accordance with any number offactors, such as desired computational rate, power levels, heattolerances, processing cycle budget, input data rates, output datarates, memory resources, data bus speeds and other design or performanceconstraints, as desired for a given implementation.

The detailed disclosure now turns to providing examples that pertain tofurther embodiments. Examples one through thirty-three provided beloware intended to be exemplary and non-limiting.

In a first example, a system, a device, an apparatus, and so forth mayinclude interface circuitry to execute one or more instruction, the oneor more instructions, that when executed, cause the interface circuitryto determine a secure memory region for a transaction, the secure memoryregion associated with a security association context to perform one ormore of an encryption/decryption operation and an authenticationoperation for the transaction, perform one or more of theencryption/decryption operation and the authentication operation for thetransaction based on the security association context, and causecommunication of the transaction.

In a second example and in furtherance of the first example, a system, adevice, an apparatus, and so forth to process the transaction comprisingone of a write transaction to put data in a remote storage and a readtransaction to get data from the remote storage, the remote storagecoupled via network interconnect.

In a third example and in furtherance of any previous example, a system,a device, an apparatus, and so forth to include the interface circuitryto determine the transaction is a read transaction to get encrypted datafrom a remote storage coupled via a network interconnect, receive theencrypted data via the network interconnect, perform theencryption/decryption operation using information from the securityassociation context to decrypt the encrypted data generating plaintextdata, and provide the plaintext data to a local memory.

In a fourth example and in furtherance of any previous example, asystem, a device, an apparatus, and so forth to include the interfacecircuitry to determine the transaction is a write transaction to putdata in a remote storage coupled via a network interconnect, perform theencryption/decryption operation using information from the securityassociation context to encrypt the data generating encrypted data, andcause communication of the encrypted data to the remote storage.

In a fifth example and in furtherance of any previous example, a system,a device, an apparatus, and so forth to include the interface circuitryto generate a message authentication code based on the plaintext data,compare the message authentication code with another messageauthentication code received from the remote storage, authenticate theplaintext data if the message authentication code matches the othermessage authentication code, and invalidate the plaintext data if themessage authentication code does not match the other messageauthentication code.

In a sixth example and in furtherance of any previous example, a system,a device, an apparatus, and so forth to include the interface circuitryto generate a message authentication code based on the data, and causecommunication of the message authentication code to the remote storage.

In a seventh example and in furtherance of any previous example, asystem, a device, an apparatus, and so forth to include the interfacecircuitry to receive a transaction request and a memory region indexvalue from an operating system to perform the transaction, the memoryregion index value associated with an entry in an memory region table,the entry comprising a security association context index to determinean entry in a security association context table specifying the securityassociation context.

In an eighth example and in furtherance of any previous example, asystem, a device, an apparatus, and so forth to include the interfacecircuitry to process the security association context comprisingcryptographic protocol information, secure key information, and startingnonce information.

In a ninth example and in furtherance of any previous example, a system,a device, an apparatus, and so forth comprising a memory to store theone or more instructions, and a network interface component includingthe interface circuitry, the network interface component coupled with aremote storage via a network interconnect.

In a tenth example and in furtherance of any previous example,embodiments may include a computer-implemented method includingdetermining a secure memory region for a transaction, the secure memoryregion associated with a security association context to perform one ormore of an encryption/decryption operation and an authenticationoperation for the transaction, performing one or more of theencryption/decryption operation and the authentication operation for thetransaction based on the security association context, and causingcommunication of the transaction.

In an eleventh example and in furtherance of any previous example,embodiments may include a computer-implemented method includingprocessing the transaction comprising one of a write transaction to putdata in a remote storage and a read transaction to get data from theremote storage, the remote storage coupled via a network interconnect.

In a twelfth example and in furtherance of any previous example,embodiments may include a computer-implemented method includingdetermining the transaction is a read transaction to get encrypted datafrom a remote storage coupled via a network interconnect, receiving theencrypted data via the network interconnect, performing theencryption/decryption operation using information from the securityassociation context to decrypt the encrypted data generating plaintextdata, and providing the plaintext data to a local memory.

In a thirteenth example and in furtherance of any previous example,embodiments may include a computer-implemented method includingdetermining the transaction is a write transaction to put data in aremote storage coupled via a network interconnect, performing theencryption/decryption operation using information from the securityassociation context to encrypt the data generating encrypted data, andcause communication of the encrypted data to the remote storage.

In a fourteenth example and in furtherance of any previous example,embodiments may include a computer-implemented method includinggenerating a message authentication code based on the plaintext data,comparing the message authentication code with another messageauthentication code received from the remote storage, authenticating theplaintext data if the message authentication code matches the othermessage authentication code, and invalidating the plaintext data if themessage authentication code does not match the other messageauthentication code.

In a fifteenth example and in furtherance of any previous example,embodiments may include a computer-implemented method includinggenerating a message authentication code based on the data, and causingcommunication of the message authentication code to the remote storage.

In a sixteenth example and in furtherance of any previous example,embodiments may include a computer-implemented method receiving atransaction request and a memory region index value from an operatingsystem to perform the transaction, the memory region index valueassociated with an entry in an memory region table, the entry comprisinga security association context index to determine an entry in a securityassociation context table specifying the security association context.

In a seventeenth example and in furtherance of any previous example,embodiments may include a computer-implemented method includingprocessing the security association context comprising cryptographicprotocol information, secure key information, and starting nonceinformation.

In an eighteenth example and in furtherance of any previous example,embodiments include a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium,comprising a plurality of instructions, that when executed, enableprocessing circuitry to determine a secure memory region for atransaction, the secure memory region associated with a securityassociation context to perform one or more of an encryption/decryptionoperation and an authentication operation for the transaction, performone or more of the encryption/decryption operation and theauthentication operation for the transaction based on the securityassociation context, and cause communication of the transaction.

In a nineteenth example and in furtherance of any previous example,embodiments include a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium,comprising a plurality of instructions, that when executed, enableprocessing circuitry to processing the transaction comprising one of awrite transaction to put data in a remote storage and a read transactionto get data from the remote storage, the remote storage coupled vianetwork interconnect.

In a twentieth example and in furtherance of any previous example,embodiments include a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium,comprising a plurality of instructions, that when executed, enableprocessing circuitry to determine the transaction is a read transactionto get encrypted data from a remote storage coupled via a networkinterconnect, receive the encrypted data via the network interconnect,perform the encryption/decryption operation using information from thesecurity association context to decrypt the encrypted data generatingplaintext data, and provide the plaintext data to a local memory.

In a twenty-first example and in furtherance of any previous example,embodiments include a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium,comprising a plurality of instructions, that when executed, enableprocessing circuitry to determine the transaction is a write transactionto put data in a remote storage coupled via a network interconnect,perform the encryption/decryption operation using information from thesecurity association context to encrypt the data generating encrypteddata, and cause communication of the encrypted data to the remotestorage.

In a twenty-second example and in furtherance of any previous example,embodiments include a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium,comprising a plurality of instructions, that when executed, enableprocessing circuitry to generate a message authentication code based onthe plaintext data, compare the message authentication code with anothermessage authentication code received from the remote storage,authenticate the plaintext data if the message authentication codematches the other message authentication code, and invalidate theplaintext data if the message authentication code does not match theother message authentication code.

In a twenty-third example and in furtherance of any previous example,embodiments include a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium,comprising a plurality of instructions, that when executed, enableprocessing circuitry to generate a message authentication code based onthe data, and cause communication of the message authentication code tothe remote storage.

In a twenty-fourth example and in furtherance of any previous example,embodiments include a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium,comprising a plurality of instructions, that when executed, enableprocessing circuitry to receive a transaction request and a memoryregion index value from an operating system to perform the transaction,the memory region index value associated with an entry in an memoryregion table, the entry comprising a security association context indexto determine an entry in a security association context table specifyingthe security association context.

In a twenty-fifth example and in furtherance of any previous example,embodiments include a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium,comprising a plurality of instructions, that when executed, enableprocessing circuitry to process the security association contextcomprising cryptographic protocol information, secure key information,and starting nonce information.

In a twenty-sixth example and in furtherance of any previous example, asystem, a device, an apparatus, and so forth to include means fordetermining a secure memory region for a transaction, the secure memoryregion associated with a security association context to perform one ormore of an encryption/decryption operation and an authenticationoperation for the transaction, means for performing one or more of theencryption/decryption operation and the authentication operation for thetransaction based on the security association context, and means forcausing communication of the transaction.

In a twenty-seventh example and in furtherance of any previous example,a system, a device, an apparatus, and so forth to include means forprocessing the transaction comprising one of a write transaction to putdata in a remote storage and a read transaction to get data from theremote storage, the remote storage coupled via a network interconnect.

In a twenty-eighth example and in furtherance of any previous example, asystem, a device, an apparatus, and so forth to include means fordetermining the transaction is a read transaction to get encrypted datafrom a remote storage coupled via a network interconnect, means forreceiving the encrypted data via the network interconnect, means forperforming the encryption/decryption operation using information fromthe security association context to decrypt the encrypted datagenerating plaintext data, and means for providing the plaintext data toa local memory.

In a twenty-ninth example and in furtherance of any previous example, asystem, a device, an apparatus, and so forth to include means fordetermining the transaction is a write transaction to put data in aremote storage coupled via a network interconnect, means for performingthe encryption/decryption operation using information from the securityassociation context to encrypt the data generating encrypted data, andmeans for causing communication of the encrypted data to the remotestorage.

In a thirtieth example and in furtherance of any previous example, asystem, a device, an apparatus, and so forth to include means forgenerating a message authentication code based on the plaintext data,means for comparing the message authentication code with another messageauthentication code received from the remote storage, means forauthenticating the plaintext data if the message authentication codematches the other message authentication code, and means forinvalidating the plaintext data if the message authentication code doesnot match the other message authentication code.

In a thirty-first example and in furtherance of any previous example, asystem, a device, an apparatus, and so forth to include means forgenerating a message authentication code based on the data, and meansfor causing communication of the message authentication code to theremote storage.

In a thirty-second example and in furtherance of any previous example, asystem, a device, an apparatus, and so forth to include means forreceiving a transaction request and a memory region index value from anoperating system to perform the transaction, the memory region indexvalue associated with an entry in an memory region table, the entrycomprising a security association context index to determine an entry ina security association context table specifying the security associationcontext.

In a thirty-third example and in furtherance of any previous example, asystem, a device, an apparatus, and so forth to include means to processthe security association context comprising cryptographic protocolinformation, secure key information, and starting nonce information.

Some embodiments may be described using the expression “one embodiment”or “an embodiment” along with their derivatives. These terms mean that aparticular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connectionwith the embodiment is included in at least one embodiment. Theappearances of the phrase “in one embodiment” in various places in thespecification are not necessarily all referring to the same embodiment.Further, some embodiments may be described using the expression“coupled” and “connected” along with their derivatives. These terms arenot necessarily intended as synonyms for each other. For example, someembodiments may be described using the terms “connected” and/or“coupled” to indicate that two or more elements are in direct physicalor electrical contact with each other. The term “coupled,” however, mayalso mean that two or more elements are not in direct contact with eachother, but yet still co-operate or interact with each other.

It is emphasized that the Abstract of the Disclosure is provided toallow a reader to quickly ascertain the nature of the technicaldisclosure. It is submitted with the understanding that it will not beused to interpret or limit the scope or meaning of the claims. Inaddition, in the foregoing Detailed Description, it can be seen thatvarious features are grouped together in a single embodiment for thepurpose of streamlining the disclosure. This method of disclosure is notto be interpreted as reflecting an intention that the claimedembodiments require more features than are expressly recited in eachclaim. Rather, as the following claims reflect, inventive subject matterlies in less than all features of a single disclosed embodiment. Thusthe following claims are hereby incorporated into the DetailedDescription, with each claim standing on its own as a separateembodiment. In the appended claims, the terms “including” and “in which”are used as the plain-English equivalents of the respective terms“comprising” and “wherein,” respectively. Moreover, the terms “first,”“second,” “third,” and so forth, are used merely as labels, and are notintended to impose numerical requirements on their objects.

What has been described above includes examples of the disclosedarchitecture. It is, of course, not possible to describe everyconceivable combination of components and/or methodologies, but one ofordinary skill in the art may recognize that many further combinationsand permutations are possible. Accordingly, the novel architecture isintended to embrace all such alterations, modifications and variationsthat fall within the spirit and scope of the appended claims.

What is claimed is:
 1. An apparatus, comprising: interface circuitry toexecute one or more instruction, the one or more instructions, that whenexecuted, cause the interface circuitry to: determine a secure memoryregion for a transaction, the secure memory region associated with asecurity association context to perform one or more of anencryption/decryption operation and an authentication operation for thetransaction; perform one or more of the encryption/decryption operationand the authentication operation for the transaction based on thesecurity association context; and cause communication of thetransaction, the transaction comprising one of a write transaction toput data in a remote storage and a read transaction to get data from theremote storage, the remote storage coupled via network interconnect. 2.The apparatus of claim 1, the interface circuitry to: determine thetransaction is a read transaction to get encrypted data from a remotestorage coupled via a network interconnect; receive the encrypted datavia the network interconnect; perform the encryption/decryptionoperation using information from the security association context todecrypt the encrypted data generating plaintext data; and provide theplaintext data to a local memory.
 3. The apparatus of claim 1, theinterface circuitry to: determine the transaction is a write transactionto put data in a remote storage coupled via a network interconnect;perform the encryption/decryption operation using information from thesecurity association context to encrypt the data generating encrypteddata; and cause communication of the encrypted data to the remotestorage.
 4. The apparatus of claim 2, the interface circuitry to:generate a message authentication code based on the plaintext data;compare the message authentication code with another messageauthentication code received from the remote storage; authenticate theplaintext data if the message authentication code matches the othermessage authentication code; and invalidate the plaintext data if themessage authentication code does not match the other messageauthentication code.
 5. The apparatus of claim 3, the interfacecircuitry to: generate a message authentication code based on the data;and cause communication of the message authentication code to the remotestorage.
 6. The apparatus of claim 1, the interface circuitry to receivea transaction request and a memory region index value from an operatingsystem to perform the transaction, the memory region index valueassociated with an entry in a memory region table associated with thesecure memory region, the entry comprising a security associationcontext index value to determine an entry in a security associationcontext table specifying the security association context.
 7. Theapparatus of claim 6, the entry in the memory region table comprising astarting nonce, and the interface circuitry to perform theencryption/decryption operation utilizing the starting nonce.
 8. Theapparatus of claim 1, the security association context comprisingcryptographic protocol information, and secure key information, and theinterface circuitry to perform the encryption/decryption operationutilizing the cryptographic protocol information and the secure keyinformation.
 9. The apparatus of claim 1, comprising: a memory to storethe one or more instructions; and a network interface componentincluding the interface circuitry, the network interface componentcoupled with a remote storage via a network interconnect.
 10. Acomputer-implemented method, comprising: determining a secure memoryregion for a transaction, the secure memory region associated with asecurity association context to perform one or more of anencryption/decryption operation and an authentication operation for thetransaction; performing one or more of the encryption/decryptionoperation and the authentication operation for the transaction based onthe security association context; and causing communication of thetransaction, the transaction comprising one of a write transaction toput data in a remote storage and a read transaction to get data from theremote storage, the remote storage coupled via network interconnect. 11.The computer-implemented method of claim 10, comprising: determining thetransaction is a read transaction to get encrypted data from a remotestorage coupled via a network interconnect; receiving the encrypted datavia the network interconnect; performing the encryption/decryptionoperation using information from the security association context todecrypt the encrypted data generating plaintext data; and providing theplaintext data to a local memory.
 12. The computer-implemented method ofclaim 10, comprising: determining the transaction is a write transactionto put data in a remote storage coupled via a network interconnect;performing the encryption/decryption operation using information fromthe security association context to encrypt the data generatingencrypted data; and cause communication of the encrypted data to theremote storage.
 13. The computer-implemented method of claim 11,comprising: generating a message authentication code based on theplaintext data; comparing the message authentication code with anothermessage authentication code received from the remote storage;authenticating the plaintext data if the message authentication codematches the other message authentication code; and invalidating theplaintext data if the message authentication code does not match theother message authentication code.
 14. The computer-implemented methodof claim 12, comprising: generating a message authentication code basedon the data; and causing communication of the message authenticationcode to the remote storage.
 15. The computer-implemented method of claim10, comprising receiving a transaction request and a memory region indexvalue from an operating system to perform the transaction, the memoryregion index value associated with an entry in an memory region tableassociated with the secure memory region, the entry comprising asecurity association context index to determine an entry in a securityassociation context table specifying the security association context.16. The computer-implemented method of claim 15, the entry in the memoryregion table comprising a starting nonce.
 17. The computer-implementedmethod of claim 10, the security association context comprisingcryptographic protocol information, and secure key information.
 18. Anon-transitory computer-readable storage medium, comprising a pluralityof instructions, that when executed, enable processing circuitry to:determine a secure memory region for a transaction, the secure memoryregion associated with a security association context to perform one ormore of an encryption/decryption operation and an authenticationoperation for the transaction; perform one or more of theencryption/decryption operation and the authentication operation for thetransaction based on the security association context; and causecommunication of the transaction, the transaction comprising one of awrite transaction to put data in a remote storage and a read transactionto get data from the remote storage, the remote storage coupled vianetwork interconnect.
 19. The computer-readable storage medium of claim18, comprising a plurality of instructions, that when executed, enableprocessing circuitry to: determine the transaction is a read transactionto get encrypted data from a remote storage coupled via a networkinterconnect; receive the encrypted data via the network interconnect;perform the encryption/decryption operation using information from thesecurity association context to decrypt the encrypted data generatingplaintext data; and provide the plaintext data to a local memory. 20.The computer-readable storage medium of claim 18, comprising a pluralityof instructions, that when executed, enable processing circuitry to:determine the transaction is a write transaction to put data in a remotestorage coupled via a network interconnect; perform theencryption/decryption operation using information from the securityassociation context to encrypt the data generating encrypted data; andcause communication of the encrypted data to the remote storage.
 21. Thecomputer-readable storage medium of claim 19, comprising a plurality ofinstructions, that when executed, enable processing circuitry to:generate a message authentication code based on the plaintext data;compare the message authentication code with another messageauthentication code received from the remote storage; authenticate theplaintext data if the message authentication code matches the othermessage authentication code; and invalidate the plaintext data if themessage authentication code does not match the other messageauthentication code.
 22. The computer-readable storage medium of claim20, comprising a plurality of instructions, that when executed, enableprocessing circuitry to: generate a message authentication code based onthe data; and cause communication of the message authentication code tothe remote storage.
 23. The computer-readable storage medium of claim18, comprising a plurality of instructions, that when executed, enableprocessing circuitry to receive a transaction request and a memoryregion index value from an operating system to perform the transaction,the memory region index value associated with an entry in an memoryregion table, the entry comprising a security association context indexvalue to determine an entry in a security association context tablespecifying the security association context.
 24. The computer-readablestorage medium of claim 23, the entry in the memory region tablecomprising a starting nonce, and the processing circuitry to perform theencryption/decryption operation utilizing the starting nonce.
 25. Thecomputer-readable storage medium of claim 18, the security associationcontext comprising cryptographic protocol information, and secure keyinformation, and the processing circuitry to perform theencryption/decryption operation utilizing the cryptographic protocolinformation and the secure key information.